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Abstract 
 
    Institutions are the equilibrium states of games, and the emergence of institutions is an 
evolutionary, stochastic, and (social) structural dependence process of interactions among 
agents. In this paper, we address the relationship between the institutional emergence and the 
structure of social interactions under the context of (network) coordination games. The model 
here shows when the agents are socially restricted, and individual decision-making is based 
on mutual agreements, inefficient institutions will be the stable states in the long run, say, 
institutions are locked-in inefficiently. When the agents are not restricted socially, the 
institutional stability will wander between two states. The efficient institutions can emerge 
only as the agents are facing strong cost constraints and, are in the contexts with relative high 
certainties, for instance, as the interactive population size is becoming smaller. 
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1 Introduction 
In a human interaction context, the issues of emergence and processes of economic systems 
should be at the heart of economic analysis. The concept of emergence is ubiquitous and, 
frequently is used in a substantial number of scientific areas and disciplines, for some 
literature clues see e.g. De Haan (2006), Harper and Lewis (2012) and Harper and Endres 
(2012). For example, from the system perspective, the phenomena of emergence occur in 
systems that are generated, where the whole system‟s behavior cannot be obtained by 
summing the isolated individual agents‟ behavior, and is unlikely to be predicted precisely. 
For a classical instance, Schelling (1971, 1978) demonstrates how the phenomenon of 
segregation emerges in a theoretical setting of the local interactions („micro-motivation‟) 
generate global patterns („macro-behavior‟). Here, we consider emergent phenomena as 
collective outcomes of agent-based interactions intentionally or unintentionally. 
The problem of the emergence of institutions is the starting point of classic economics 
(Elsner, 1986, 1989), also is the fundamental issue of the modern institutional economics. It 
is difficult to neglect that, some economists, mainly of self-deemed new institutionalists, 
argue that institutions, strictly are inanimate objects, can be designed artificially and therefore 
exogenously given. Actually, such so-called institutions are apparently designed, but they are 
just the external expressions of the existed results of social interactions that are endogenous 
in economy and related activities. For example, the establishments of laws always are the 
results of artificially designed, written and published by some experts and official 
organizations, but it is not the whole story of the emergence of laws indeed. In general, it is 
required by the objective needs of real worlds in which the people and some lawsuits have 
been harmed since lacking of proper laws or, of the strict implement of the laws. Moreover, it 
is natural to image some people have tried to find suitable law cases or legal provisions to 
remedy those problems, but it is not adequate to cover all potential loopholes. Hence, a lot of 
uncertainties and gambling will be emerged due to the imperfection of the legal system. As 
we are at the legislation, the different parties with own interests will definitely intervene the 
establishment of specific provisions, and finally, the established law will be a result of 
compromise, coordination as well as cooperation, or say, of series of games. Therefore, 
institutions have always been considered as the device to reduce uncertainties, but their 
emergence are frequently sketched as the results of strategic interactions of agents (Elsner, 
1989, Lesourne et al., 2006), hence, a crucial question arises here is “why and in what ways 
do individuals coordinate their behavior (Elsner, 1989, p.190)” in the process of something 
new comes out. 
Game theory is the most powerful branch of applied mathematics in dealing with the 
behaviors in interacting strategic situations, which interprets an institution as an equilibrium 
state consciously or unconsciously reached by several agents (Walliser, 2006, and moreover, 
for the pioneer works, see Schotter, 1981/2008 and Axelrod, 1984/2006 for instance). 
Walliser (2006) concludes that there are three explanatory approaches, say, and the process of 
collective choice, deduction and evolution, to be considered for any emergent phenomenon in 
the game theoretical contexts. In a collective way, the institutions are considered as the result 
of a voluntary choice process, and are directly introduced in the decision process. For 
instance, in the situation of coordination failure, a planned institution aim at solving the 
problem can be determined in a favorable way by some prior agents, i.e. they can make some 
forbidden provisions on the specific possibilities. Hence, the institutions are exogenously 
given. Nevertheless, in some situation, the institutions will be treated as stemming as an 
equilibrium state from some games. In such deductive process, the agents embedded in 
games can achieve instantaneously an equilibrium state perfectly conceptualized through 
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reasoning and computing. Nevertheless, the deductive approach requires that the agents are 
full cognitive rationality and to reason at the same time and it cannot offer an efficient way to 
deal with the situation with multiple equilibria. The evolutionary approach with more 
unrestricted behavioral assumptions is proposed to deal with the emergence of specific 
institution (particularly convention) among possible ones (also see Sugden, 1995; Binmore 
and Samuelson, 2006), for example, the approach of evolutionary stable states, and 
stochastically stable equilibrium will be discussed below. 
Sociologists, for instance Granovetter (1985), have criticized economists for neglecting the 
roles of social networks in economic transactions, because all agents are involved in different 
kinds of social networks, and their behaviors naturally are influenced by the neighbors. For 
instance, the decision of an agent to install new document processing software is usually 
influenced by the choices of her or his colleagues and co-workers. A large volume of 
theoretical and empirical studies has investigated the role of networks in game theoretical 
models.Currently, such criticize is accepted widely by economists, for example, a recent 
investigation by Aoki (2011). The social networks where interacting agents embedded, bring 
some novel highlights to the game theoretical approach (for the fundamental issues, see e.g. 
Goyal (2007) and Jackson (2008), and for recent reviews, see e.g. Galeotti et al., 2010; 
Jackson and Zenou, 2014), correspondingly, to the emergence of institutions. Hence, in sum, 
the emergence of institutions is an evolutionary, stochastic, and (social) structural 
dependence process of interactions among agents. 
   The remainders of the paper are organized as following. In the next section, the basic 
modeling background and the approaches of multiple equilibrium selection will be introduced. 
The section 3 gives the models of institutional emergence. In this section, we mainly frame 
the effects of network dynamics, like links, locations, and agent distance, in this issue. Finally, 
it concludes.  
 
2 Coordination Games and the Emergence of Institutions 
2.1 Coordination Games and Multiple Equilibrium Selection  
Coordination games, for instance, adoption of new technology, common technology 
standards, traffic rules, choice of languages or software, as well as social norms, have 
numerous distinct characteristics, which make them widely applied and interesting in many 
contexts of modeling with multiple Nash equilibria when players choose the same or 
corresponding strategies. 
   The typical instance for coordination games is the traffic problems of choosing the side for 
driving, which can be presented by the possibility if     ,    , and     , see table 1.  
Table 1: The Basic Structure of Coordination Games 
 
In a simplified sense, a most basic rule should be established to avoid colliding head on when 
two drivers meet on a narrow road. If they can drive coordinately, that is to say, on the action 
combination       or       in the payoff matrix, and follow the same bidirectional traffic 
rules, both of them are following left-hand traffic rule or right-hand traffic rule, therefore can 
                 Agent 2 
 
Agent 1 
 A B 
A a, a c, d 
B d, c b, b 
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benefit from coordinating their actions. Formally, such traffic rules can be considered as the 
equilibria of coordination games, and the rules we selected to follow are the results of 
equilibrium selection. In a general sense, we cannot distinguish the advantages and 
disadvantages of these two kinds of rules. At the very beginning, each country therefore 
specifies a uniform traffic rule without any idiocratic reason in reality, after many shifts, 
currently people in around     countries drive in right-hand, and the others oppositely. 
Furthermore, with a substantial probability, this proportion is still continuously changing. 
Such of kinds of issues of equilibrium selection, like the dynamic selection mechanism of 
traffic rules, therefore should be investigated deeply, why do not all countries follow the 
same traffic rules, and how do they coordinate in the same way across most countries? At 
first glance, the individuals will be better off from coordinating with others, and we identify 
such process to be coordinated as the process of emergence of basic social institutions. For 
example, the individual can realize the benefits from obeying the coordinated institutional 
behavior of the other individuals. 
   Comparing to the problems of the selection of traffic rules, coordinating issues in the real 
world are more complicated, for instance, when agents have their own preferences on the 
specific actions, or some restricted coordination possibilities, so it is necessary to extend the 
analysis of coordination games through assuming various of payoffs numerically. Generally, 
we can distinguish such kinds of games by whether the agents have interest conflicts for the 
purpose of coordination. If we assume that     and        , such situation can be 
termed as a Stag Hunt game, which was briefly told by the French philosopher, Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality (originally published by Marc-Michel Rey in 1755 in 
Holland). 
This game describes a situation in which two hunters are hunting together, each of them can 
individually choose to hunt a stag or a hare without communications. If one hunter chooses to 
hunt a stag, he must cooperate with the other one, both of them can obtain 10 as a result of 
cooperation, otherwise, he cannot success in hunting a stag and obtain therefore 0. Any 
individual hunter can hunt a hare separately, and obtain 8 as the other hunter tries to hunt a 
stag, or obtain 7 in a coordination case of hare, which is less for the individuals since a stag is 
much more valuable than a hare, however the overall payoff is better off than in the dis-
coordination case. Here the optimal outcome can be reached only if they can work together 
on hunting stag coordinately, however, both of them are in the risk of dis-coordination. See 
the table 2. 
Table 2: Stag Hunt Game 
                 Agent 2 
 
Agent 1 
 Stag Hare 
Stag 10, 10 0, 8 
Hare  8,   0 7, 7 
   Hence, we have learned that, there are two pure strategy equilibria       is Pareto efficient 
and payoff dominant,       is risk dominant in the terminology of Harsanyi and Selten 
(1988) in coordination games. 
Hereby we investigate the processes and mechanisms of emergences of institutions 
applying the coordination problem devices with various payoff structures, the corresponding 
properties of institutions exhibit certain distinct varieties. In this current article, we define the 
emergence of institutions as the result of equilibrium selection of coordination games (Stag-
hunt game, specifically). Such an equilibrium achieved, in other word, can be considered as 
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the conventional way to play the game (Young, 1993). Young (1996) argues that a 
convention can be established through two ways. One is by the central authority, for example, 
a new revolutionary government prone to change the existed governing rules; the other way is 
by the gradual accretion of precedent, such avenue is much more common than the former 
one, since most conventions emerge as local custom, and spread across regions over 
generations. In reality, these two ways are mutually inclusive. Hence, the focus here is to 
elucidate how the selective mechanism works, or to which of the equilibria of an unperturbed 
process converges. Even following this analysis way, there are also distinct approached to 
define what a convention is, for instance, in the landmark textbook, Weibull (1995, p.34) 
argues that an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS, hereafter) may be thought of as a 
convention, nevertheless, similarly, the absorbing state of a Markov chain is termed as a 
convention in Young (1993). Intuitively, the emergence of any convention cannot be 
predicted in advance, instead, as the interactions are repeated over time and resolved through 
chance. This leads to more agents hearing about and applying it, then consequently, the way 
of behaving formed after a consequence of positive feedback loops. It will be showed that the 
selection of a convention is not because of its superiorities over others, but due to some 
historical circumstances, for instance, someone made mistakes. 
 
2.2 The Stochastic Stable Equilibrium 
A substantial number of scientific inquiries in evolutionary game theory have attempted to 
elaborate the issues of equilibrium selection in coordination games. In contrast to the 
traditional approaches to equilibrium refinements, which cannot provide a precise selection 
mechanism from multiple Nash equilibria, the evolutionary theoretical methods apply some 
feasible tools, for example, ESS, stochastically strategy equilibrium (SSE, hereafter), etc., to 
such issues. 
   In general, the combination of two dynamic mechanisms, say, mutation mechanism that 
generates variety and selection mechanism that highlights some varieties over all, formalizes 
an evolutionary process. Here, the focus is the later one and to find the mechanism of the 
spreading of an equilibrium strategy within a population. The core concept in evolutionary 
game theory, that is, ESS, was initiated and defined by the seminal works of Maynard Smith 
and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1974), and in the extensive form games by Selten 
(1983) for dealing with the stability and robustness of strategies in a population, and a normal 
form game developed in Maynard Smith (1982). It has significantly drawn the attention of 
the research about the equilibrium selection to the evolutionary perspective. The ESS is a 
strategy (can be pure or mixed), which is adopted by a population of agents once, cannot be 
invaded by any other small mutant strategies. The agents playing an ESS fare better than the 
mutants with invasion strategies in the population do and therefore the whole population will 
converge to an evolutionary stable state in the long run. It implies that any low frequent 
biological mutation or economic experimentation, such as one time shock, cannot live or 
exist over an extended period.  
   For Example, in the Stag Hunt game in the Table 2 shows, we can calculate the ESS of this 
game, when the population state is at the interval            it will converge to the stable 
state     , which means all agents will choose the strategy Hare. When          , it will 
converge to the stable state     , which means all agents will choose strategy Stag. Hence, 
both      and      are ESS, but        is not an ESS.  
However, in the conceptual context of ESS, we cannot predict which stable state will be 
converged when at the unstable points, for example, at the point        . Similarly, the 
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prediction of an ESS mainly depends on the initial conditions of population configuration. 
Hence, we can conclude that the ESS is a locally and dynamically stable equilibrium, not 
determined, and both of equilibria have same probability to be reached regardless of the 
initial population distribution. 
In the ESS approach, the evolutionary process is driven by the power of switch to the best 
response against the current strategy configuration. However, Foster and Young (1990) argue 
that the concept of ESS does not capture the effects of stochastic perturbations, i.e., the 
dynamic of population frequencies, of the evolutionary systems over the long run, since it 
treats any deviation from equilibria as an isolated event. Therefore, any small invasion of 
mutant strategies will only live shortly and the initial equilibrium state will be restored. In 
reality, the evolutionary process is repeatedly perturbed by random mutations, for example, 
births and deaths, which shows that such successive perturbation processes much more 
significant selection properties, say, it can make selections among strict Nash equilibria, 
while the ESS cannot. For a recent comparative comment, see e.g., Sandholm (2008) and 
Young (2011). Thus a concept of SSE, which is different from both the traditional ESS and 
the strange attractor of a dynamical system, in a context of stochastic dynamical system by 
virtue of the mathematical techniques by Freidlin and Wentzell (1984), is developed by 
Foster and Young (1990). For instance, in the case of symmetric payoff structure, a desirable 
way to coordinate is going to follow the mass, and the ESS of this game therefore may easily 
be identified. However, if we introduce a small noise term, i.e. the unstable proportion of 
agents playing specific strategies, the environmental changes, and mutations as well, this 
situation will be complicated in the stochastic selection processes, and the asymptotic 
behavior of the system might be changed. 
    Let us describe the evolutionary behavior via a discrete-time, irreducible, recurrent, 
aperiodic Markov chain
1
 {  
   }
    
 
 on the state space   , where      represents the noises 
or mutations in the system, or say, some of agents have a probability to drop the previous 
strategies and simply switch to a new one without any appropriate reason. When the system is 
buffeted constantly by such small random shocks, in the context of ESS, the distribution of 
stable strategies will be restored repeatedly. However, an ESS only is stable for the 
continuous dynamic, but is false in a context of discrete dynamics, under a non-degeneracy 
condition (Taylor and Jonker, 1978); furthermore, it cannot predict the unique long run 
equilibrium as the games with multiple stable equilibria. However, if we take into account the 
experimentation, for given    , let      be the transition matrix2 of the perturbed process 
and   be the limit invariant distribution3, then, we have         which always is known as 
Global Balance Condition, which gives the long run trend of the Markov chain. The notion of 
SSE can be defined as follows. 
   Definition 1 The population state        is stochastically stable if it has positive weight 
in the limit invariant distributions       of Markov Chains, i.e.                , when 
the mutation   goes arbitrarily small or zero: 
                                                          
1
 A Markov chain is collection of random variables {  }  with the Markov property that the future state 
(        ) is conditionally independent of the past states, given the current state. Formally,  
        |                             |           
2
 The transition matrix is the represent of transitions between the states in the state space, for example,      can 
be interpreted as the probability of transition from state   to state  .   
3
 Such distribution, or say, equilibrium vector, gives the long run trend of the Markov chain. It shows that the 
random process will come closer and closer to a stationary state, independent of the initial distribution, under the 
power of transition matrix. 
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     A stochastically stable population is a limit distribution vector as     and     . 
Intuitively, when the noise goes very small, we can ignore the intermediate states (or say, 
transient states) and ensure that the system will converge to one of stable states in the long 
run. 
   Definition 2: Absorbing State: a state    of a Markov Chain is absorbing if      |     . 
    If the population dynamic is an absorbing Markov chain, the selection of the final stable 
state with probability one highly depends on the initial state, rather, in the case of no 
absorbing state, namely a regular Markov chain, the stationary distribution is concentrated on 
one of pure equilibria with a probability closed to one, as the noise is small. Furthermore, in 
the latter case, the final state is independent on the initial state and the dynamic processes 
(Young, 1993). For some applications, we will see the tight connections between the risk 
dominant strategy and the SSE, or say, no intermediate strategies are selected in the long run 
(i.e. Kandori et al. (1993), Ellison (1993), and Ellison (2000) as well). Hence, the main idea 
of SSE is that the vanishing mutation rate is a selection mechanism which choose the 
comparative stable absorbing states of the multiple equilibria, since the number of mutation 
(or the cost of switching, or the length of path) determines the final states selected, that is, the 
states can be achieved through minimum mutations. The highlight of this approach is able to 
select from strict Nash equilibria comparing to some of other refinements. However, it should 
be pointed out that if the agents make mistakes than can be thought, in this case, the process 
cannot converge to absorbing states, or say, the SSE only can be observed when the noise 
goes to zero. 
    Thus, the basic issue here is to design an algorithm for the limit distribution of the 
population. In the case of Young (1993), he applies a method of shortest path, and shows the 
risk dominant equilibrium is the unique SSE in      coordination games.  
   Theorem 1 (Young (1993), p.72) let      be a     matrix game with two strict Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies. The generically stable equilibria are the weakly risk dominant 
Nash equilibria. 
   Considering the table 2 as a numerical example, by the best reply rule,       |   
      |  , then we have the critical mass                            , 
where   is the number of playing strategy stag,   is the whole population, say        
           as    . Hence, the transition of    , it needs at least 5 mutations, in 
contrast, the transition of     can be done within no more than 2 mutations, thus the 
potential state of playing Hare needs more smaller cost to be stable, say, the risk dominant 
strategy, say Hare, is the only SSE. 
    In summary, the evolutionary process will be perturbed from the equilibrium or leaving the 
path of best response from an absorbing state if agents make mistakes, and furthermore, it is 
not predictable as the system is not determined, none can predict the conventional 
equilibrium always being played. However, the stochastically stable convention, of which 
limit stationary distribution is close to a specific convention, will be observed in the long run 
when the probability of noise goes to zero or very small. We can observe that the final 
convergence has nothing to do with the payoff structure of coordination and initial states, but 
the length of path to the stable is co-determined by the payoff structure and the population 
size. 
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3. The Model of Institutional Emergence  
 3.1 The Basic Elements of the Model 
3.1.1 The Networks 
We consider a finite set of agents, or say, a population, is denoted by , with members 
          and    , connected in a network , and assume that the agents are bounded 
rational and partially informed of the game being played. Formally, let     {  |     
         } be the link between the agent   and  , and the links represents the interactions 
(can be directly or indirectly) among the agents. We suppose that     {   }, and if       
say that the agent   has a link with agent  , obviously, one agent cannot connect with himself, 
say      . If        , the network   is undirected, conversely, the network    is directed if 
       , for any agents   and  . 
    The neighbors of agent   are      who connect. The set of neighbors of agent    is 
denoted by       {   |     }    . In addition, the degree (     ) of an agent    can 
be presented by the number of its neighbors, say,              . The degree distribution 
(    ) of a network is a description of the relative frequencies of agents that have different 
degrees, and is the fundamental characteristic of the network (Jackson, 2008), 
thus  ∑ (     )   . The average degree in network   can be defined as  ∑     . For 
example, in a star network, the core agent has     neighbors, or say, has degree    , 
while the other peripheral agents having degree 1. Hence, the degree distribution of this 
network is             , and            , and the average degree is        . An 
attractive concern in the study of networks is about a kind of networks whose degree 
distribution approximately follows a power law, called scale-free network. Many networks 
are scale free, for instance, World Wide Web, professional collaborative networks, etc. (see, 
e.g. Barabási and Albert (1999), Barabási (2009), among others, for details). 
   We denote     as the distance, which is the length of the shortest path between   and   in the 
network, between agents   and  . Hence, we can define the set of neighbors, which have 
distance   from agent  as  
      for example, in a complete network, for any agent    we 
have ∑   
              , since the distance is   between any agents. If there is no path 
between the agents, then the distance is infinite by convention. 
Assumption 1: The agents in networks meet each other with probabilities    : 
(1) For each agent i, the probability is      ;  
(2) For the agents   and  , the probabilities      , and ∑    
 
     , for all   
This assumption imposes that the “self-meeting” is not a possibility, or say oneself do not 
necessarily coordinate himself. In addition, the sub-assumption 2 shows that the agents can 
meet each other completely as long as the network is complete and the agents interact 
globally. In the context of global interactions,              for any      
3.1.2 The Game Setting 
A game on a network    can be defined as an interaction situation within a population of   
agents. The payoff of agent   is the average payoff in   over her or his         neighbors on 
the same network. The set of actions or strategies         , say, for example   {    } in 
the     coordination game, which are given in the Table 2 above. For the convenience, we 
remind here again of the payoff structure,      and        , hence,       is the 
efficient equilibrium, and       is the risk dominant equilibrium. Furthermore, we suppose 
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that an efficient equilibrium represents an efficient institution, similarly, the risk dominant 
equilibrium selected means inefficient institutions emerge. The average payoff function of 
agent   in the network game is then given by, 
   
∑                
  
 
Definition 3: A population state   is a Nash equilibrium, if for the agent     , and each 
strategy         such that      , 
                       
Assumption 2: We apply the myopic best reply rule in the consideration of strategic switches. 
In a population state   for both strategies   and:  
(1) An agent playing strategy   switches strategy when    |       |    , analogously,  
(2) An agent playing strategy   switches strategy when    |        |     . 
Such assumption implies when the current payoff from games is lower than the potential 
payoff after switching strategies, the agents will change their strategies, i.e., if the payoff to 
agent when   of   agents (including the objective agent himself) playing   is less than the 
payoff he would obtain if he were switch to  , when      agents (excluding himself) still 
play the strategy  . Alternatively, simply say, the agent only need to compare his current 
payoff to the expected immediate payoff, because they cannot have much knowledge and 
computing abilities to form the payoff expectation of the very far future. 
 
3.2 The Static Analysis of Institutional Emergence 
We start our analysis by considering the social networks are fixed, which means the agents, 
links, and topology of networks, except the strategies playing, do not change in the process of 
games. The purpose of this sub-section is to examine the distribution of the stable state when 
the agents are restricted in the networks. 
   Proposition 1: When there are immobile  agents, 
     (i) in a complete network   , when                    , the SSE will be the 
risk dominant strategy; on contrary, when                    , the SSE will be 
the payoff dominant strategy. 
     (ii) in a star network   , there are two SSEs if the central agent adjust strategy firstly; the 
situation will be same with the case (i) above if the peripheral agents start to change the 
strategies. 
   (iii) in a circle network   , if the scope of interaction                   , the 
ESS will be the risk dominant strategy   in the long run, otherwise, the SSE will be the payoff 
dominant strategy   . 
First, we consider a situation where all   agents are fully linked in the network, or say which 
can be defined a complete network   . There are          links in whole networks and 
    links each agent has. We start from a situation where all agents       are playing 
strategy A, and suppose some of agents will adjust their strategies from A to B 
unintentionally, denoted as    
  . Hence, if any agent   tries to adjust the strategy at least it 
should meet the myopic best reply rule     |        |     .We have following, if all 
agents are playing strategy   initially: 
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   , 
                                              
        
        
Then,       , we have,  
                                         
     
              
   
 ,                                            (3.1) 
Analogously, if all agents are playing B initially, then we have, 
                                           
     
              
   
 ,                                           (3.2)                                
Following the logic of SSE, we need to compare the relative cost of strategic adjustment 
(  
  and   
  ), then we get the critic point of population involved is                 . 
If the payoff structure meets the condition of Stag-Hunt game, for the simplicity, we apply 
the numerical example in the Table 2, that is, a=10, b=7, c=0, d=8. Then the inequalities (3.1) 
and (3.2) can be written respectively as   
            and   
            . When 
    (  is positive integer), then   
     
  , hence, the cost of       is greater than that 
of      , the SSE will converge to risk dominant strategy B in the long term. In contrast, 
say, when    , in the large population, the SSE will converge to the payoff dominant one 
in the long run. This conclusion is opposite to that of Jackson and Watts (2002) which does 
not consider the population size, and they argue the only equilibrium state is the risk 
dominant one.                                  
Second, consider a case where the   agents form a star network   , in which only one 
agent is at the core, and connect with the other     peripheral separated agents. There are 
    links in whole networks and     links the central agent has and only one link each 
peripheral agent has. If the central agent adjusts his strategy first, the strategies of agents in 
whole network will be changed, and both adjustments just only take one tremble, hence, both 
of these equilibria are the stable strategy in the long run, also see the cases in Jackson and 
Watts (2002). Actually, once the central agent is supposed to be the first mover, such 
situation is equivalent to the issue of two agents‟ game. If the peripheral agents adjust the 
strategies first, in which the only investigation is its influence on the central agent. Again, we 
start from a situation where all agents (    ) are playing strategy  , then the critical point 
for the central agent is where the payoff will be improved if he switches to the strategy  . 
The adjustments of strategy of the central agent will lead to the switches of whole network, 
according to the myopic best reply rule. which have same dynamic mechanism with the 
complete network above since the central agent is completed connected, the situation of SSE 
will be same as the complete network in the long run.  
Third, consider a case where the   agents form a circle network   , in which the agents 
linked from head to tail. There are   links in whole networks and two direct links each agent 
exactly has. In this situation, the scope of interactions should be taken into account. We 
suppose each agent   interacts with  neighbors (     ), and some of agents will adjust 
their strategies, denoted as   
  . Following the same reply rule, we start from the situation 
where    agents playing  , then have: 
         
         
   , 
         
        
      . 
Then,  
                                              
     
                
   
                                         (3.3) 
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 Analogously, if all agents are playing B, then we have, 
                                             
     
                
   
                                           (3.4) 
Following the logic of SSE, we obtain the critic point determined by               
   via comparing the cost of adjustment. In the case of Stag-Hunt game shown in Table 2 we 
rewrite the inequities (3.3) and (3.4) as   
             and   
            
respectively. Following the logic of SSE, we need to compare the relative cost of strategic 
adjustment. Since only    (  is positive integer),          , which means when 
the agent only interact with one neighbor, the SSE will be the risk dominant strategy   in the 
long run, otherwise, the SSE will be the payoff dominant strategy  . 
Hence, in summary, we have learned that the distribution of stable strategy is determined 
by the payoff structure of games and the topology of networks where the agents interact with 
each other. In the case of immobility, the agents lose the opportunities to choose the network 
and only can adjust their strategies to reach an improved situation. For example, if they are 
fully connected in a large network, a payoff dominant strategy can be feasible in the long run. 
In addition, if the connectivity is limited, in a circle for instance, a possible way for achieving 
a better solution is to expand the interaction scope.  In words, we suggest that in some 
societies under strict restrictions, a possible way to break through an inefficient barrier is to 
make the social connections closer. In this case, the people will have more possibilities to 
communicate and exchange information, and opinions than that they can before. Therefore, it 
would be expected that the payoff dominant strategy could be achieved if the social networks 
are open and the agents can freely leave from or stay at, or move on the networks.  
 
3.3 The Dynamic Analysis of Institutional Emergence 
3.3.1 Link Dynamics 
In this subsection, we consider the influence of link dynamics on the equilibrium selection. 
The decision of links is an obvious feature of social interaction comparing to the classical 
game theory. Besides the strategic adjustments, the agents also can decide to serve or 
establish links with his interactive connections at the previous rounds. We propose a new 
term       as the total cost of link adjustments,   is the cost of establishing links, 
and    is the cost of maintain links. At each round, the agents will be informed of the 
payoffs and the distribution of strategies, and then they can decide to change the strategies, or 
to serve links with those who playing opposite strategy, or to adjust links and strategies 
simultaneously. In addition, we also classify the situations whether the links are based on the 
mutual agreements of agents, and compare the effects of between unilateral links and bilateral 
links.  
Proposition 2 
 (1) Under strong cost constraints, say,               , the only stable 
strategy is the payoff dominant one; 
(2) Under weak cost constraints, say,                or          
      If the agents only can adjust the links, whenever the links are unilateral or bilateral, 
two stable states coexists. If the agents can adjust the links and strategy simultaneous, when 
the links are unilateral, the payoff dominant strategy will be the stable state, if the trembling 
level meets   
     
    or    
     
   ; when the links are bilateral, it converges to the risk 
dominant one 
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For the first case, when we are facing strong cost constraints,               , 
it is relatively straightforward. Here there is only one possible situation that the agents have 
no choice to play the strategy  , or mis-coordinate due to the cost constraints, they have to 
stay the payoff dominant strategy for a positive result, furthermore, the adjustment process 
independents on the network structure. When the agents form links, whatever unilaterally or 
bilaterally, including establish one and sever one. The agents make strategic decisions on 
removing or adding links based on the computation of payoff following the assumption of the 
myopic best reply rule. Given a state where  agents complete connected playing strategy  , 
all of them will lose at least         at each stage. In such situation, the agents, in one 
way, can keep the network complete disconnected for avoiding of lose; in the other way, for 
maintaining the networks and keep profitable for all connections, the agents have to adjust 
the strategy (with probability     ) to the payoff dominant one (strategy   ). Hence, 
intuitively, in a situation with higher cost to keep the social interactions, the agents will be 
forced to find the only profitable strategy; otherwise, they will face more uncertainties as in 
the case of isolation. Conversely, in a situation where all agents are playing the strategy  , no 
agent would change strategy if some agents adjust strategy mistakenly, even some one 
unintendly leaves from the payoff dominant strategy, and he or she will come back 
immediately.  
    Now we move to how agents establish and sever links, and how they adjust the strategies 
based on the mutual agreements. In the situation, the process of strategic adjustment is a 
based on the mechanism of link formation. We suppose that agents   and   are linked, 
say,        If the links are unilateral, the agents can freely make the link decisions based on 
personal payoff at each period. Simply, if we face very strong cost constraints on the link 
adjustments as above, the network formation will be obviously at the payoff dominant state, 
and no two agents have incentive to leave from the stable states.  
Secondly, under weak cost constraints conditions, the cost of maintaining and establishing 
the links cannot have a determine influence on the selection of the multiple equilibria. If the 
links are unilateral, the phenomena of mis-coordination will be avoided due to the weak cost 
constraints, we thus only need to address the problem of multiple equilibria selection. Now, 
the agents will have three options to adapt the adjustments of strategies, first of all, they can 
switch the strategies and keep their network structure, then this situation will be same to the 
static analysis we have addressed before, and the factors of link adjustments will be 
meaningless. Secondly, the agents can consider trying to connect new neighbors without any 
strategic changes. Thus, the formation of network will be continuously changed as the 
adjustments of the strategies. To see this, we suppose that all agents initially are playing the 
strategy    and completely connect with each other. Some agents unintentionally switch to 
play the strategy  , and then the agents playing   would like to sever links with those agents 
at once to avoid of more losses. Hence, the agents playing   are isolated and the former 
network is collapsed, say, two clusters of agents playing strategy   and   will appear as a 
temporary network structure. So to speak, as long as the mistakes cannot be avoided, the 
formation of networks will converge to two stable states with quiet high speed, however, the 
stable states are not easily kept since the relative lower cost of link adjustments. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that the agents cannot change their strategies, hence, there are not issues of 
equilibrium selections, and the structure of distribution of strategies is highly dependents on 
the initial states of strategies.  
    However, in contrast to the situation with unilateral links above, we have to discuss the 
possibilities of mis-coordination since the links are bilaterally. Because the overall payoff of 
an agent is based on the interacting partners, once this agent changed his strategy in order to 
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adapt some partners, the remaining partners will be trapped into mis-coordination. For 
example, an agent playing strategy   switches his strategy B in order to his growing 
interacting partners playing   ,  then, his partners playing A will be exploited by him, but 
cannot sever the links with him without his permission. As the case of unilateral links 
formation, we will not discuss the situation where the agents only can adjust strategy. Then, 
we immediately move to the case of adjusting links. Intuitively, if the benefit of links is zero 
or negative for both, this link can be severed. We start from a situation where all 
agents         playing strategy  , some of them (  
  ) mistakenly switch to  , if the other 
agents      
    do not adjust the strategy, the    
   agents have no incentive to sever these 
links because they can exploit the other agents playing opposite strategy. Similarly, if we start 
from a situation where all playing  , the remaining      
    will benefit from the trembles 
of    
   and prefer to stay in such state. In words, the networks will be at two stable states if 
the agents cannot adjust strategies.  
Thirdly, still under weak cost constraints conditions, the agents can adjust the links and 
strategy simultaneously, and then the network is formed endogenously. Suppose that any 
agents can adjust their strategies and connections as they are under the situation of mis-
coordination, thus, the expected payoff function will be depend on the individual strategy 
(with probability      to change strategy). The probability of meeting the specific strategic 
species (with probability      , we assumed the fraction of new linked agents playing same 
strategy is     after the strategy adjustment). We start from the condition of all agents playing 
strategy  , and   
   agents make mistakes. Thus, we have the expectation payoff function,  
           
       
   , 
             
         
           
      
 If the agents want to adjust the strategy, that is,       , then,  
                                           
   
          
                  
   
   .                                     (3.5) 
 Suppose that   agents playing strategy   at the initial state,  
           
       
   , 
             
         
           
     
 If the agents want to adjust the strategy, that is,       , then,  
                               
   
          
                  
   
   .                                        (3.6) 
Now, in order to compare the relative cost of strategic adjustment, we should compare   
    
and    
   . Then, we have,    
      
    
                      
[                ][                ]
  , that is, 
  
      
      Because the inequalities (3.5) and (3.6) are not parallel, the space will be 
divided into three domains, which are confined by   
    and    
   , say, we face three 
possibilities to discuss the convergence states:  
I: if   
     
   , it converges to the payoff dominant one in the long run, since   
     
  ; 
II: if   
     
   , it converges to the payoff dominant one in the long run too, since   
   
  
  ; 
III: if   
      
     
     
   , in this sub-domain, the comparison between the relative 
cost is ambiguous. Therefore, both two states are possible.  
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Now, the issue of the value of trembling is becoming crucial. Obviously, if the values of 
  
    and   
    are closer, the possibility of   
     
   will be higher. Let   
      
   , then, we 
will have        , that is, the risk of strategy adjustment is same for both sides. In 
general, under the Stag hunt games, such ambiguous situations will not disappear. However, 
the population size and probability meeting same strategy have strong impacts on the 
achievement of the payoff dominant strategy.  As the population size is increasing, the 
probability of meeting same strategy agents is decreasing, accordingly, the critical mass for 
the payoff dominant strategy will be increasing. In short, the payoff dominant strategy will be 
the stable state under certain trembling level, say,   
     
    or    
     
   , in addition, in 
the ambiguous sub-domain, we cannot tell the stable solution, and as the population size is 
becoming lager, this ambiguous area will become larger, and it is more difficulty to reach the 
payoff dominant stable state. 
   When the links are bilateral, the link adjustment is based on the mutual agreements. The 
requirements for adjusting the links and strategy simultaneously therefore cannot be satisfied, 
since the exploiters do not have incentives to sever links, as the links are unilateral shown 
before. The exploiters will not disappear until all agents are playing the strategy    Hence, as 
the mutation rate goes to zero, the network will be stable at the risk dominant one. 
 
3.3.2 Location Dynamics 
Imagine in a city where a number of residents live in different areas and houses. Every day, 
the most residents are involved in several interactions, i.e. shopping, working, recreation, etc. 
of which some can be interpreted as some kinds of coordination games. It is nature that we 
suppose that some of residents are uncomfortable in the activities of interactions, say, in the 
inefficient situations or mis-coordination. For a better context, they can move to a new 
location freely, for example, find a new job, move to a new apartment, or just go to a new 
supermarket for pleasure shopping environment. However, with relative lower possibilities, 
they move to another city or go to a supermarket 100 kilometers away from home. Hence, we 
can argue that most interactions take place locally in most environments, i.e., places of work, 
social communities, etc. Consequently, the problem of space limitation or competition may 
arise. In this subsection, we will address such issues of what roles of location dynamics play 
in the coordination games. 
At the initial state, the whole population   randomly locates on the social networks. Let 
  {          } represent the set of possible locations (     ) on the networks. In 
such context, the connections between agents depend on those of locations, or say, the agents 
are the belongings to the locations, which are neighboring relations. The agents can choose 
their neighborhoods through moving between locations, after the immigration, the agents 
have the chances to adjust their strategies to the one that gained highest payoff in the previous 
period with a positive probability according to the best reply rule. 
Assumption 2: at every period   , each agent receives the opportunity, (1) to adjust his 
strategy with probability    ; and (2) to change his location with probability    . 
 We assume that the agents will consider whether change the location each period, after 
randomly location at the very beginning of the games. The probability   and   may depend 
on the distribution of strategies in the networks and the expectation payoffs. In addition, for 
simplicity, we do not consider the heterogeneity of agents, locations, and periods. Moreover, 
we assume that strategy adjustment occurs with greater possibility than to move to new 
locations, say,    , such assumption also can be found in Ely (2002). At every period, the 
agents only can observe the average payoff of agents by both strategies at their locations   , 
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rather than the average payoff of the individual strategies. Therefore, the movements of 
agents only depend on the judgment of location preferences or neighborhood structure at each 
period. Furthermore, they also need to observe the average payoffs by both strategies at other 
locations    and, to calculate their expected payoff after moving to the new locations.  
Formally, at each period of plays, the agents will observe the average payoffs of strategies, 
then, they make decision of strategy and location adjustment sequentially. Before going 
deeper, we should clarify the differences between link dynamics and location dynamics. On 
the surface, when an agent is leaving from a location, it means he or she breaks the links with 
the connections at the same time. It is unnecessary to address their dynamics separately. 
However, the links between agents are not equivalent to the locations completely. For 
example, in a complete network, leaving from a location, the agent maybe leave the whole 
network; conversely, as breaking a link or some links, the agent is still in the network as long 
as the population    . For another example, when a network contains of some (location) 
clusters, which are formed based on heterogeneous strategies, the agents will make the 
decision of leaving or staying in the current locations depends on the average payoff of both 
strategies of their local neighbors. As the Figure 3  shows, each location stands for a strategy 
and the strategy number stands for its payoff under coordination, and when mis-coordination, 
the strategy with smaller number will obtain all, hence the payoff structure satisfies the 
condition of coordination game, and the strategy 1 is the most risk dominant one, the strategy 
  is the most payoff dominant one. Meanwhile, it shows us some pure strategy clusters and 
strategy mixture clusters. Now, if the agents can calculate the average payoff within two 
paths, say, they are locally informed or can observe. Considering the agent A, B, and C as 
objects respectively, for the agent  , all his local neighbors are playing the strategy 1 and 
have same gains except the agent B, yet, he has no information of other strategies, so he will 
stay and remain the strategy. For the agent B, his local neighbors have different gains, so he 
will consider move to a new location, or adjust strategy, or both. For agent C, his local 
neighbors with three kinds of strategy have different gains, and he will find that strategy 2 
has highest average payoff and adjust to it with higher probability. 
 
Figure 3: The Location Dynamics 
After the moves, the agents who have not moved adjust their strategies. However, one 
point should be clear that the probability ( ) of strategy adjustment is independent on the 
strategic mutation rate above. Such probability of adjustment is determined by, for the 
location instance, the capacity of networks, relative payoffs, and the probability of location 
adjustment. For example, if the agents can change their locations freely, it is reasonable that 
they can adjust strategies with a positive probability. However, if they cannot move, and will 
definitely     ) change strategies for keeping connected. Therefore, we will discuss three 
combinations: (1) moving and adjusting, (2) moving but not adjusting, and (3) not moving 
but adjusting, of dynamics of locations in each scenario below. In summary, we will discuss, 
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        {      }
 
Suppose that the agents are fully connected, the payoff function will be as follows, under 
the conditions as in the Table 1. If the agent at    is playing strategy  , then, 
                   
 Analogously, if the agent at    is playing strategy  , then, 
                   
, where      is the number of playing strategy   in the neighbors of agents at   , then the 
number of playing   is     . 
Hence, at the location   , given the distribution of strategies and the formation of networks, 
the agent will choose his strategy through comparing the payoffs        and        . Thus, 
we have, 
                                          
 , then,  
                                  
, if              , it will be required that                    ⁄⁄ . 
Because         , from the perspective of population distribution, the neighbors 
with same strategy will be required, when the efficient strategy is selected. For example, in 
the Stag-Hunt game as the Table 2 shows, the relative ratio of the agents playing different 
strategies at least is          ⁄        , so to speak, the risk dominant strategy can be 
satisfied by a relative lower heterogeneous network structure. 
3.4 Social Distance  
Formally, the interactive agents are involved in various social relationships in different forms, 
economically or politically for instance. Furthermore, within the social interactions, the social 
functions of the agents may therefore be differentiated since the distinct properties of social 
structure they embedded. We will introduce here the concept of social distance between 
agents to describe the changing social structure, and investigate its impacts of on the 
emergence of institutions.  
Social distance can be explained in various forms in terms of its underlying problems. 
Firstly, in general, social distance will be geographical (Akerlof, 1997), for example, each 
agent has a proprietary location, which represents where the agent is. In a star network, the 
distance between the core agent and the peripheral agents is 1, and the distance between the 
peripheral agents is 2. The close topics to such sense of social distance are the research on 
segregation (Schelling, 1969, 1971, 1978), and on social mobility (Beshers and Laumann, 
1967). When we consider social structure as a network, the agents with distinct 
characteristics, e.g. race, age, gender, etc., may move based on their corresponding demands 
on the networks. Specifically, in the case of social mobility, i.e. occupational mobility, we 
may take the path and distance of the flows of the mobility into account, then the 
differentiation or the gap between them would become significant in terms of the formation 
and dynamics of the social networks. 
Secondly, in practice, social distance also can be psychological, which is subjectively 
defined on several dimensions, for instance, emotional, mental, and condition contingent, etc. 
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(Trope and Liberman, 2010). Furthermore, it highly depends on the formations and 
conditions of the social interactions in the specific environments in terms of the underlying 
organizational structure and civilization level. As Dai et al. (2011) argue that the 
psychological distance will be larger than its expected normal level in the society or 
environment without relative high-generalized trust level. For example, under the context of 
military confrontation, the leaders from all sides can sit together, say, the geographical 
distance is close, however, they will try best to maximize their own interests, even to kill 
each other deliberately, say, meanwhile the psychological distance among them is quite far. 
Hence, it is obvious that such kinds of distance cannot be measured precisely.  
Now let us reformulate the payoff function considering the distance between interacting 
agents. Now, we have the baseline payoff function.  
   ∑
       
      
 
   Before we go further, one point should be pointed out, that is, we only consider the effects 
of social distance under a static situation. Such simplifying setting can immediately find the 
role of social distance in individual decisions, and can separate the effects of movements 
from the investigation. Now we suppose that all agents are playing   initially, and then we 
have the expected payoff as follows: 
             
           , 
               
            
If the agents want to adjust the strategy, that is,       , then,  
                                
        
                 
   
 ,                             (3.7) 
Analogously, if all agents are playing B initially, then we have, 
                                
       
               
   
,                                   (3.8) 
Then we compare the relative cost of population transition, the critic point of population 
involved is                 . Such result is same to that of in the static situations. 
Hence, both population size and payoff structure here are the determine factors, the stable 
equilibrium states are codetermined by these factors, see the cases in the static analysis above. 
   Now, interestingly, the social distance among agents does not have significant influence on 
the equilibrium selection. However, the absolute level of the number of trembles in the single 
decision will be influenced by the social distance. Simply say, the influences of trembles 
from some agents who locate in distanced places of networks will be smaller than that from 
closer agents, which can be easily found in the inequalities (3.7) and (3.8). Therefore, if we 
are trying to approach to an efficient equilibrium, the distant agents should devote more 
efforts on that, on the contrary, the agents, who have more close neighbors, impose much 
significant influence on the entire dynamics. However, the stable states still is fundamentally 
determined by the payoff structure.  
    In summary, under the dynamic situations, the efficient equilibrium can be the only stable 
state, when the agents are facing strong adjustment cost constraints. This is an external 
selection mechanism.  When such constraints are becoming weaker or the agents can neglect 
its impacts, the emergence of efficient equilibrium will depends on the other factors, for 
instance, when the agents are facing some kinds of certainties, i.e., interactive population size 
is relative smaller, the efficient equilibrium can be the stable state. Nevertheless, when the 
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agents are freely to adjust strategies and to move on the networks, they will be locked-in the 
inefficient equilibrium. In terms of institutions, the emergence of efficient institutions can 
emerge in some conditions, for example, when the inefficient institutions cannot offer enough 
benefits, and force the agents would try to establish better institutions. However, in general, 
when the external constraints are not strong as that, the (social) payoff structure will be the 
fundamental factor, which defines the distribution of benefits of current society, say, if the 
payoffs to the different human behaviors can be modeled as a Stag-hunt game, then the 
agents will be locked in, and governed by, the inefficient institutions. 
 
4 Conclusion 
In this paper, we define institutions are the equilibrium states of games and, consider the 
emergence of institutions is an evolutionary, stochastic, and (social) structural dependence 
process of interactions among agents. We found that when the agents are restricted socially 
and lose the opportunities to choose the network and only can adjust their strategies to reach 
an improved situation. A possible way to break through an inefficient barrier is to make the 
social connections closer. In this case, the people will have more possibilities to communicate 
and exchange information, and opinions than that they can before. When the agents are not 
restricted socially, say, they can interact with the agents as they want and, move on the 
networks freely, then, the institutional stability will wander on the two states. Only when the 
agents are facing some kinds of certainties, the efficient equilibrium can be emerge. However, 
the most important determinative is the payoff structure of the social games, which define the 
social distribution of benefits. For example, social distance among agents has significance on 
the individual decision-making, but it cannot determine the final stable state. In addition, an 
external mechanism also is found in this paper, that is, when the external cost constraints are 
very strong, it will force the interactive agents to improve the situation, and efficient 
institution can emerge.  
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